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USE-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a landfill operator's increase in its daily volume of intake was a valid nonconforming use
for which no zoning variance was necessary.
PROPERTY LAW-ZONING ORDINANCE-NONCONFORMING

Township of Chartiers v. William H. Martin, Inc.,

-

Pa.

542 A.2d 985 (1988).
William H. Martin, Inc. and Chambers Development Company,
Inc. (hereinafter Chambers) own and operate a landfill known as
the Arden landfill in Chartiers Township, Washington County,
Pennsylvania.1 The landfill encompasses 160 acres and is divided
by its terrain into an east valley, a west valley and a buffer area.2
The site is located in an area zoned residential, but exists as a legal
nonconforming use under the Chartiers Township Zoning Ordinance.3 Chambers operates under a permit from the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources (DER) which authorizes
the Arden landfill to process 2,000 cubic yards of waste' per day.4
Upon contracting with four New Jersey municipalities, Chambers increased its daily intake for waste treatment at the Arden
landfill.' The DER announced new regulations which would require Chambers to apply for a permit modification if it planned to
exceed the daily limit of 2,000 cubic yards.' Subsequently, Cham1. Township of Chartiers v. William H. Martin, Inc., - Pa. , 542 A.2d 985
(1988). William H. Martin, Inc. is a subsidiary of Chambers and prior to Chambers' involvement in the landfill, Martin operated the property as a sanitary landfill. Chambers transformed the site into a modern waste treatment plant facility licensed by the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources (DER). Id. at 986.
2. Id. At the turn of the century both valleys were used to burn trash. Id.
3.

Id.

CHARTIERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE

§ 901.1 provides:

Section 901.1 - Nonconforming Use Regulation. Lawful uses, located either within a
building or other structure, or part thereof, or on the land, or in combination of both,
which at the effective date of this Ordinance or subsequent amendment thereto become nonconforming, may be continued so long as they remain otherwise lawful; including subsequent sales of the property subject to the following regulations.
Id.
4. Chartiers,542 A.2d at 986. Chambers contended that the 2,000 cubic yard limit was
merely an estimate in its permit application that in the past had been used only for bonding
purposes. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petitioner's Application for Extraordinary
Relief at 2, Township of Chartiers v. William H. Martin, Inc., - Pa. -, 542 A.2d 985
(1988) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
5. Chartiers,542 A.2d at 986.
6. Id.
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bers challenged the proposed DER regulations7 and applied for a
permit modification under protest to increase the maximum daily
waste volume from 2000 cubic yards per day to 12,000 cubic yards
per day at the Arden Landfill 8 The commonwealth court issued a
preliminary injunction on July 31, 1987, which enjoined the DER
from enforcing the existing daily volume limit of 2,000 cubic yards
per day at the Arden landfill.9
On August 10, 1987, the Township of Chartiers filed an action in
equity10 seeking to limit the intake volume at the Arden landfill.1
The Washington County Court of Common Pleas issued a preliminary injunction on August 18, 1987, which enjoined Chambers (1)
from dumping in the east valley without obtaining a zoning variance, and (2) from exceeding the 2,000 cubic yard daily limit for
waste disposal without obtaining a zoning variance. 2 The next day
the court eliminated the section of the order prohibiting waste disposal in the east valley, but retained the section of the order imposing the 2,000 cubic yard daily limit.' 3
In issuing the preliminary injunction, the trial court relied on a
7. Id. Chambers Dev. Co., Inc. v. Department of Environmental Resources, 110 Pa.
Commw. 432, 532 A.2d 928 (1987). The commonwealth court held that it lacked original
jurisdiction to hear the challenge to the DER proposed regulations. The court found that an
adequate statutory remedy existed by petitioning the Environmental Hearing Board for relief. Id. at 434, 532 A.2d at 929-930.
The legal battle between Chambers and the DER ended recently. The DER approved
Chambers' request to accept more waste at the Arden landfill, amending its permit to allow
an average of 2,800 tons of garbage daily. The DER's approval includes a concession for
local officials and residents who opposed the increased truck traffic and the out-of-state
source of some of the waste. According to that concession, the company must negotiate with
Chartiers Township and Washington County to provide capacity under terms of the state's
new solid-waste-disposal law. See Pittsburgh Press, Sept. 25, 1988, at B7, col. 4.
8. Petitioner's Brief in Support of Application for Extraordinary Relief at 4, Township of Chartiers v. William H. Martin, Inc., - Pa. -_, 542 A.2d 985 (1988) [hereinafter
Brief for Petitioner].
9. Id.
10. The equity action was filed pursuant to 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10617 (Purdon
1968), which provides for enforcement remedies for violation of zoning ordinances. Municipalities are statutorily empowered to seek equitable relief to restrain violations of their zoning ordinances, and such power is not limited by the power of municipalities to impose
penalties for violations. See Township of South Fayette v. Boy's Home, 31 Pa. Commw. 254,
376 A.2d 663 (1977); Hilltown Township v. Mager, 6 Pa. Commw. 90, 293 A.2d 631 (1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 979 (1973).
11. Chartiers, 542 A.2d at 987.
12. Brief for Petitioner at 5-6.
13. William H. Martin, Inc. v. Township of Chartiers, Pa. Commw.
-, 545
A.2d 409 (1988). Chambers was enjoined from collecting, transporting, processing, receiving,
accepting or disposing of solid waste at the Arden Landfill in excess of a maximum daily
volume of 2,000 cubic yards or its equivalent in tonnage without obtaining a variance from
the Zoning Hearing Board. Id.
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line of cases," the most recent being the 1981 decision in Putkow5 which
ski v. City of Scranton,"
held that a change in the methods
and quantity of production can be so vast as to constitute a new
use rather than merely the extension of an existing nonconforming
use. Secondly, the trial court applied a Chartiers zoning ordinance16 which forbade the expansion of a nonconforming use of
over twenty-five percent without obtaining a variance17 from the
Zoning Hearing Board.18 The township construed this ordinance to
mean that a nonconforming user must seek a variance from the
Board prior to any expansion, and such expansion, if approved, is
limited by ordinance to a twenty-five percent increase.19 Chambers
argued that there was no expansion, that the 160 acres was a landfill at all times and this ordinance would allow a twenty-five percent expansion, or forty acres, as of right.2" The trial court granted
the preliminary injunction because it concluded that the volume
increase of waste being dumped at the Arden landfill was a per se
violation of the applicable zoning ordinance. 2 Furthermore, the
court of common pleas found that the two new cranes employed by
Chambers to handle the increased tonnage altered the noncon14. See, e.g., Township of Kelly v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 36 Pa. Commw. 509, 388 A.2d
347 (1978); Casilio and Sons v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of the Township of Stroud, 26 Pa.
Commw. 608, 364 A.2d 969 (1976).
15. 58 Pa. Commw. 604, 428 A.2d 743 (1981).
16. Chartiers, 542 A.2d at 987-88. Section 901.6 of CHARTIERS TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING
ORDINANCE, entitled Expansion or Extension of Nonconforming Uses, provides:
Natural and reasonable expansion and extension of nonconforming uses not in excess
of twenty-five percent and in accordance with this Ordinance may be permitted by
the Zoning Hearing Board after public hearing under these conditions:
1. The owner or operator desiring such expansion or extension shall file an application with the Building Inspector who shall thereupon set the matter for hearing
before the Board.
2. Any use which is substantially different from the original non-conforming use shall
be prohibited.
3. Additional parking area of itself shall not be considered an expansion.
Id.
17. The criteria for obtaining a variance are rigorous. The landowner must show there
will be no adverse effect on the public's health, welfare or safety, and that the property has
unique characteristics which would render a hardship and make the property valueless unless the variance were granted. The reasons justifying the grant of variances must be substantive, serious and compelling. Economic loss alone is not sufficient grounds for a variance. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10912 (Purdon 1968).
18. Brief for Petitioner at 6. Zoning ordinances which limit expansion of a nonconforming use to twenty-five percent of existing use are constitutional. See Torak v. Board of
Adjustment of Upper Merrion Township, 2 Pa. Commw. 48, 277 A.2d 521 (1971).
19. Brief for Petitioner at 13.
20. Brief for Respondent at 16.
21. Chartiers, 542 A.2d at 987.
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forming use."
On appeal by Chambers, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court stayed the trial court's injunction.2 3 Judge Bucher in his order applied the standards for a stay pending appeal as enunciated
in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Process Gas Consumers Group.24 The factors in that test are:
(1) The petitioner makes a strong showing that he is likely to prevail on the
merits. (2) The petitioner has shown that without the requested relief, he
will suffer irreparable injury. (3) The issuance of a stay will not substantially harm other interested parties in the proceedings. (4) The issuance of a
stay will not adversely affect the public interest. 5

In applying these factors, the court may grant the stay if the petitioner merely makes a substantial case on the merits and the remaining three factors strongly favor interim relief.26
The commonwealth court, based upon oral argument and the
trial court record, concluded that the weight of the testimony favored Chambers' position that the landfill was a valid nonconforming use and the volume increase did not constitute an unlawful expansion or a new use." Judge Bucher also noted that based on the
testimony of a township supervisor,2 8 Chartiers sought the injunction to circumvent the United States Supreme Court decision in
22. Id. at 989 n.5.
23. William H. Martin, Inc. v. Township of Chartiers, Memorandum and Order of
Judge Wilson Bucher, August 28, 1987.
24. 502 Pa. 545, 467 A.2d 805 (1983). In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rejected the standard for a stay of preliminary injunction set forth in Allets, Inc. v. Penn
Township Bd. of Supervisors, 67 Pa. Commw. 326, 447 A.2d 329 (1982), and adopted the
standard employed by the federal district courts, as established in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
25. William H. Martin, Inc. v. Township of Chartiers, Memorandum and Order of
Judge Wilson Bucher, August 28, 1987.
26. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Process Gas Consumers Group, 502 Pa. 545,
552, 467 A.2d 805, 809 (1983). This modification occurred in the federal district courts as a
result of Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
27. Chartiers, 542 A.2d at 987.
28. Id. Judge Bucher's opinion states: "A finder of fact could conclude from the testimony of Michael J. Cuskey, a Chartiers Township Supervisor, that this suit was brought to
circumvent the holding of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey (citations omitted)." Id. The
testimony referred to in Judge Bucher's order was as follows:
Q. Sir, did the Township Supervisors decide they were going to try to prevent the
New Jersey waste from being brought into the landfill?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that the reason you instructed your Solicitor to bring this litigation?
A. Yes.
Id. (Footnote 2 to Judge Bucher's order) (p. 90 N.T.).
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City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey,"' which held that discrimination against out of state waste violates the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution."
Chartiers asked the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to assume
plenary jurisdiction, to vacate the commonwealth court stay and to
reinstate the trial court's preliminary injunction. 1 In an opinion
by Justice McDermott, the supreme court concluded that Chambers had met the standards of Process Gas, and affirmed the entry
of the stay by the commonwealth court.3 2 The supreme court also
held that the "natural expansion doctrine" gave the landfill operators the absolute right to increase the daily volume of intake as a
29. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). At issue was the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute which prohibited the importation of most solid and liquid
waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the state. If the
statute was categorized as an economic protectionist maneuver, it would be held per se unconstitutional as violative of the commerce clause, after the Supreme Court concluded garbage was within the meaning of commerce. On the other hand, if the statute was directed at
legitimate local concerns which only incidentally impacted on interstate commerce, it would
be upheld as a valid exercise of the state's police power. The Supreme Court concluded that
garbage is garbage no matter where it originated, and this statute discriminated against the
out-of-state waste. Furthermore, the Court stated that New Jersey had engaged in a protectionist measure which imposed on out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of conserving the state's remaining landfill space. Id. at 629.
In closing, Justice Stewart noted:
Today, cities in Pennsylvania and New York find it expedient or necessary to send
their waste into New Jersey for disposal, and New Jersey claims the right to close its
borders to such traffic. Tomorrow, cities in New Jersey may find it expedient or necessary to send their waste into Pennsylvania or New York for disposal, and those
states might then claim the right to close their borders. The Commerce Clause will
protect New Jersey in the future, just as it protects her neighbors now, from the
efforts by one state to isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem shared by all.
Id.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, would have allowed the
state, under its exercise of police power regarding the health and safety problems posed to
citizens, to restrict the inflow of waste. Id. at 629-33.
30. Chartiers,542 A.2d at 987.
31. Justice McDermott was joined by Justices Nix, Larson and Flaherty in this opinion. Justice Zappala did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. Justice
Pappadakos dissented on the grounds he would not have accepted plenary jurisdiction of
this matter. Id. at 990. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 726 (Purdon 1981) confers extraordinary
jurisdiction powers upon the supreme court. It states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Supreme Court may, on its own motion or upon petition of any party, in any matter pending before any court or district
justice of this Commonwealth involving an issue of immediate public importance, assume plenary jurisdiction of such matter at any stage thereof and enter a final order
or otherwise cause right and justice to be done.
Id.
32. Chartiers, 542 A.2d at 987.
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matter of zoning law. 33

The township argued that the commonwealth court did not employ the appropriate standard of review, merely to determine if
any reasonable grounds for the trial court's issuance of the preliminary injunction existed.34 A per se violation of the applicable zoning ordinance, as the trial court found, constitutes reasonable
grounds upon which the preliminary injunction should be upheld. 5
Chartiers contended that the commonwealth court based its decision on the weight of the testimony presented that Chambers
would prevail on the merits rather than the reasonable grounds
standard. 36 Chambers also argued that egregious error was not
committed by the commonwealth court's application of the Process
Gas standard. 7 On review, the supreme court looked at the record
to determine if the commonwealth
court had misapplied the stan3
dards of Process Gas. 8

To determine whether Chambers was likely to prevail on the
merits, the supreme court had to decide if the company's activity
constituted an expansion of fa nonconforming use in violation of
the township zoning ordinance.3 9 The court applied the "natural
expansion doctrine," which grants the landowner an absolute right
to expand a nonconforming use to a certain extent, considering the
effect on the public's welfare, safety and health. 0 Relying on past
decisions upholding this doctrine, 1 Justice McDermott reasoned
33. Id. at 989.
34. Id. at 989-990.
35. Brief for Petitioner at 12. Chartiers Township cited Section 617 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10617 (Purdon 1968), which
expressly empowers a municipality to seek injunctive relief to restrain violators of its zoning
ordinance. The township also cited cases that hold where a state or municipality brings an
action for injunctive relief to enjoin violation of a statute or ordinance, the traditional prerequisites for issuing a preliminary injunction are not applicable. All that need be shown is
that the plaintiff has a clear right to relief, which is shown by establishing a violation of law
or an ordinance. Brief for Petitioner at 11. See City of Scranton v. Baiderman, 74 Pa.
Commw. 367, 460 A.2d 1199 (1983); Commonwealth v. Coward, 489 Pa. 327, 414 A.2d 91
(1980); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Israel, 356 Pa. 401, 52 A.2d 317 (1947); East
Bradford Township v. Champaine, 26 Pa. Commw. 168, 362 A.2d 1117 (1976); Mager v.
Hilltown Township, 6 Pa. Commw. 90, 293 A.2d 631 (1972).
36. Brief for Petitioner at 12.
37. Brief for Respondent at 11-12.
38. Chartiers,542 A.2d at 987.
39. Id. at 987-88. See supra note 16.
40. Id. Nationally, courts will not apply the expansion limit to volume increases. One
practical reason for this is that such a provision would be difficult to police. Id.
41. Id. The court relied upon Cheswick Borough v. Bechman, 352 Pa. 79, 42 A.2d 60
(1945), for the proposition that the extension of a nonconforming use was proper so as not
to deprive the owners of the use of their property. The court also cited Humphreys v. Stuart
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that "an overly technical assessment of [an existing nonconforming] use cannot be utilized to 9tunt its natural development and
growth." 42 Therefore, the court concluded that Chambers had an
absolute right to expand since it was not changing the use of the
property' or extending the use beyond the 160 acres. 4
Chartiers' argument that expansion should be calculated from
volume increase did not prevail.' 5 The court construed the twentyfive percent expansion limit of the Chartiers zoning ordinance as
being confined to the original nonconforming area rather than the
increased activity within the area.46 Chartiers' second argument,
that an alteration in method or quantity of production could be so
vast so as to constitute a new use, even though the original intent
of use was the same,' 7 was also rejected.' 8 Justice McDermott limited the authority of three commonwealth court opinions which
supports this proposition.' 9 Further, he found that Chambers was
not changing the intended use of the Arden landfill as a landfill.50
The supreme court determined that Chambers was likely to prevail
on the merits, and that Chartiers did not have an actionable claim
against the landfill operators for the accelerated use of its own
property; therefore, the first prong of the Process Gas test was satisfied in favor of Chambers.5 1
Realty Corp., 364 Pa. 616, 73 A.2d 407 (1950); Grubb Appeal, 395 Pa. 619, 151 A.2d 599
(1959); Pierce Appeal, 384 Pa. 100, 119 A.2d 506 (1956); Mack Zoning Appeal, 384 Pa. 586,
122 A.2d 48 (1956).
42. Chartiers,542 A.2d at 988. The court cited Putkowski v. City of Scranton, 58 Pa.
Commw. 604, 428 A.2d 743 (1981); Township of Kelly v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 36 Pa.
Commw. 509, 388 A.2d 347 (1978); and Casilio and Sons v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of the Township of Stroud, 26 Pa. Commw. 608, 364 A.2d 969 (1976).
43. Chartiers,542 A.2d at 989. The court reasoned that "Chambers was not changing
the intended use of the property, and was not expanding the use beyond the area which was
contemplated for such use at the time the landfill became nonconforming." Id.
44. Id. at 989. The court said, "[g]iven these parameters it would seem, as a matter of
zoning law, that Chambers had an absolute right to increase the daily volume of intake, and
to utilize the east valley, without the necessity of obtaining a variance." Id. (emphasis in
original).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. Chartiers introduced evidence of increase of truck traffic from 101 trucks per
day to 157.8 trucks (average) after August 1, 1987. Improvements at the Arden landfill included two new truck scales, a new electric pole, paving and two new cranes which were
larger than any used in the past. Brief for Petitioner at 16-17.
48. Chartiers, 542 A.2d at 989.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Justice McDermott pointed to the lack of evidence presented by the Township
as criteria for the Process Gas test. In particular, he noted the record did not contain testimony that the increased operations would adversely affect the health, safety or welfare of
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Justice McDermott proceeded to examine the record to determine if the commonwealth court had properly applied the remaining prongs of Process Gas.52 Upon this examination, the supreme
court found that Chambers met its burden of showing irreparable
injury if forbidden to accept New Jersey waste.5 The township
also failed to offer evidence as to the harm that would inure to the
township's health, welfare, or safety from an increased intake.54
Additionally, the court discounted the township's argument of potential harm due to the estimated eighteen year reduction of the
landfill's active life.5 5 The supreme court concluded that Chambers
met the remaining standards of Process Gas and was entitled to
the stay of the injunction in light of the township's lack of evidence of harm to the township's health, safety or welfare posed by
the increased intake.6
A nonconforming use is defined as a use of land which lawfully
antedates the enactment of a zoning ordinance and which is maintained after the effective date of such ordinance, even though it
does not comply with the use restrictions applicable to the area in
which it is located.5 7 Nonconforming uses run counter to the essence of Euclidean zoning, which contends that there is a place for
everything and everything in its place.5" At first, municipal planthe community. Id.
52. Id. at 989-990.
53. Id. The supreme court pointed to testimony of a Chambers' vice-president to show
irreparable harm. The harm consisted of a price increase which would be necessitated by the
exclusion of the New Jersey waste, a layoff of the newly hired workers and a loss of reputation and future business if it could not comply with its contracts. Since the Township failed
to rebut this evidence at the hearing, the court accepted it as evidence of the irreparable
harm Chambers would suffer. Id.
54. Id. at 990. The court noted that:
Absent from the record was testimony that the increase in operations by Chambers
would either adversely affect the surrounding neighbors in the enjoyment of their
property or that traffic congestion would increase due to additional trucks using the
site. At no time was it demonstrated to the court that the increased activity would
adversely affect the health, safety or welfare of the community.
Id.
55. Id. The court noted that the landfill operation was a private concern of Chambers
and not an assertable claim of the Township. Id.
56. Id.
57. 6 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, § 41.01 [1] (1983).
58. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). This landmark
case held that zoning ordinances are valid exercises of the police power of the state and do
not constitute takings without just compensation. Euclidean zoning refers to the division of
an area into various zones in which only certain types of activity or uses of land are permitted, such as residential zones, R1-R5; commercial zones, C1-C3; manufacturing zones, MlM3; industrial zones, I1-I5; and conservation zones. The types of structures, areas, uses and
dimensional requirements are strictly regulated so as to provide homogeneous land use,
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ners and zoning boards had hoped that through policies of discouragement, nonconforming uses would wither away and be replaced
by conforming uses. 59 On the contrary, given an oftentimes monopolistic position in the community, the nonconforming use
flourished.6 0
Courts, however, have not disregarded the policy considerations
which prompted the limitation of nonconforming uses and the
eventual elimination of such uses.6 1 Four methods have been utilized to eliminate nonconforming uses throughout the United
States with varying degrees of success: eminent domain proceedings, abandonment, prohibitions or limitations on extensions and
repairs, and amortization. 2 The prevailing view today is that nonconforming uses are necessary evils.68
Several reasons have been suggested for municipalities' continuance of the nonconforming use. First, nonconforming uses protect
present investment while encouraging future investment. Second,
the continuance of nonconforming uses will help prevent economic
waste." Furthermore, a constitutional due process implication prohibits the outright elimination or even severe restriction of nonconforming uses by a zoning ordinance.6 5
Pennsylvania, for historical and political reasons relating to the
protection of the Commonwealth's heavy industrial base, is one of
the more protective jurisdictions in handling the extension and expansion of nonconforming uses.6 The courts developed the "natural expansion" doctrine, which basically allows the nonconforming
use to be expanded as a matter of right with the growth of business
without limiting the use to the precise size that existed at the time
7
the zoning ordinance was passed.
One year after the United States Supreme Court in Village of
thereby increasing the happiness among the residents.

59. See Note, Amortization of Property Uses Nonconforming to Zoning Regulations,
9 U. CHI. L. REV. 477, 479 (1942).
60. Id.
61. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW

OF ZONING,

3d,

§

6.07 (1986).

62. Katarincic, Elimination of Nonconforming Uses, Buildings, and Structures of
Amortization-Concept versus Law, 2 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1963).
63. See ROHAN, supra note 57, at § 41.01[3].
64. See Note, Nonconforming Uses: A Rationale and Approach, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 91,
106-07 (1953).
65. See Note, The Expansion Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 22 U. PIrr. L. REV. 747, 750

(1961).
66. See 4 A. RATHKOPF,
67.

Id.

THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING,

§ 51.07 (1983).
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Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company8 8 upheld zoning as a proper exercise of the police power of the state, which does not constitute a
taking, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court preserved some of the
property rights of the nonconforming use owners with its doctrine
of natural expansion announced in the 1927 case, In re Gilfillan's
6 9 In dictum, the
Permit.
court proclaimed that a nonconforming
use cannot be precisely limited to the magnitude existing at the
time of the passage of the ordinance, but may be increased to the
extent required by natural expansion and growth of trade allowing
for physical extension. 70 The court did note, however, that any expansion is subject to being non-detrimental to the public's health,
welfare, safety or morals.7 '
The next year, in Haller's Bakery Company's Appeal, 7 2 the
court allowed the owner of a nonconforming use to include the capacity which was unused at the time of the passing of the ordinance to be utilized as part of the nonconforming use.7 The court
found that the purpose of the ordinance limiting nonconforming
uses was to protect existing uses.7 4 The court declared that an existing use does not depend on actual, substantial or regular use,
and declined to consider the extent of the quantity or quality of
the use, requiring only that the use exist in some form.7 5 Noncon68. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
69. 291 Pa. 358, 140 A. 136 (1927). In that case, a zoning ordinance bisected the plaintiff's property into a residential and commercial zone on which plaintiff operated a lumber
business. He had applied for a variance to build a concrete building on the portion of his
property zoned residential. The Board of Adjustments denied his request. The supreme
court held that this was an abuse of discretion. The court continued:
Petitioner's business had been established at its present location long before the passing of the zoning ordinance, and was actively conducted at the time the ordinance
went into effect; accordingly, as the property was then used for lawful purposes, the
city was without power to compel a change in the nature of the use, or prevent the
owner from making such necessary additions to the existing structures as were
needed to provide for its natural expansion and the accommodation of increased
trade, so long as such additions would not be detrimental to the public welfare, safety
and health.
Id. at 362.
70. Id.
71. Id. These considerations are the normal justification for the exercise of zoning as
an exercise of the state's police power.
72. 295 Pa. 257, 145 A. 77 (1928). The ordinance in question allowed, as a permitted
use, structures which could stable four horses. Structures which could stable five and up
were considered nonconforming uses. At the time the ordinance took effect, the plaintiff had
a stable with the capacity to accommodate twenty-four horses, although only four were stabled at the time. Id. at 259.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 261.
75. Id. The supreme court rejected the lower court's opinion which relied upon the
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forming uses were permitted to be utilized to full capacity.
Further refinement of the natural expansion doctrine occurred in
the 1945 case of Cheswick Borough v. Bechman,7 e which permitted
the employment of modern and more effective instrumentalities,
provided that they are ordinarily and reasonably adapted to the
conduct of an existing business." The court construed the zoning
ordinance permitting nonconforming uses liberally, stating that the
ordinance's purpose was to prohibit new uses. 8 The court refused
to limit the nonconforming use to the extent that it existed when
the zoning ordinance classifying it nonconforming was passed, reasoning that such an interpretation would deprive the property
owners of the use as effectively as if the ordinance was totally prohibitive. 79 The court added that it is not essential that the entire
tract of land upon which the business is being conducted be utilized at the time the ordinance is enacted.80
Throughout the 1950's, when zoning issues sparked debates in
law reviews and courts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court continued its support of the doctrine of natural expansion of nonconforming uses.8 1 The court further protected nonconforming uses by
holding that the nonconforming use runs with the land, not with
the ownership of the land.8 2 This extension of the doctrine was not
universally supported because the nonconforming use would run
indefinitely."
doctrine of actual or substantial use of the date of the adoption of the ordinance, and in this
case found that there was no real, substantive use or sufficient regularity of use to characterize it as an existing use. The supreme court considered whether the use existed before,
whether there was an intent to continue and whether any effort was made to do so. Id. at
261-262.
76. 352 Pa. 79, 42 A.2d 60 (1945). This case arose as Cheswick borough sought to enjoin, as a nuisance, the use of a rotary screen device in the defendant's sand and loam excavation business. When this argument failed, Cheswick contended that the rotary screen device was not a continuance of a pre-existing use. The supreme court held that the
nonconforming use may be extended in scope and may utilize the entire tract. Id. at 81-82.
77. Id. at 82-83.
78. Id. at 82.
79. Id. The court did not explain why a limitation on a nonconforming use would be
equivalent to a total prohibition of the use.
80. Id.
81. Examples of cases which upheld the natural expansion doctrine include: Humphreys v. Stuart Realty Corp., 364 Pa. 616, 73 A.2d 407 (1950); Firth v. Scherzberg, 366 Pa.
443, 73 A.2d 443 (1951); Pierce Appeal, 384 Pa. 100, 119 A.2d 506 (1956); Mack Appeal, 384
Pa. 586, 122 A.2d 48 (1956); Davis Appeal, 367 Pa. 340, 80 A.2d 789 (1951); Upper Darby
Township Appeal, 391 Pa. 347, 138 A.2d 99 (1958); and Grubb Appeal, 395 Pa. 619, 151 A.2d
599 (1959).
82. See Eitner v. Kreitz Corp., 404 Pa. 406, 172 A.2d 320, 323 (1961).
83. Justice Eagen criticized the Eitner doctrine that a nonconforming use runs with
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In Gross v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that expansion of a nonconforming use by
a reasonable accessory use,8 5 which is not detrimental to public
health, welfare or safety, is permitted under Pennsylvania law. a"
The court explained that a nonconforming use is a vested property
right which may only be destroyed by being declared a nuisance,
being abandoned by the property owner or being extinguished by
87
eminent domain.
Relying on Gross, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced
constitutional grounding for the natural expansion doctrine in Silver v. Zoning Board of Appeals.8 8 At issue in Silver was the constitutionality of a city zoning ordinance which prohibited the increase
in the number of units of certain nonconforming apartment buildings.8 9 The court, in allowing the owner of the nonconforming
building to subdivide the property to create more units, held that
"the right to natural expansion is a constitutional right protected
by the due process clause."9 0 The rationale offered by the court for
the land in dicta in Jackson v. Pottstown Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 426 Pa. 534, 233 A.2d
252 (1967). His personal view is that:
Such situations (change in an existing nonconforming use coupled with a change of
ownership) pose a threat to effective zoning without the mitigating factor of protection of property rights being present. Thus, it may well be that the Eitner view,
supra, could bear re-examination in light of the 'rationale' stated above, as well as for
the very pragmatic reason of preventing trafficking in nonconforming'uses (and thus
thwarting the vitality of Pennsylvania zoning).
Id. at 539 n.5, 233 A.2d at 255 n.5.
84. 424 Pa. 603, 227 A.2d 824 (1967). This case involved a bowling alley operator's
application for a variance for the addition of restaurant facilities to compete with the local
bowling alley which had snack bars. The bowling alley existed by variance. By analogy to
the situation of the owner of a nonconforming use which is permitted to expand to compete,
the court found a vested property right in the property owner of a use permitted by variance. Id. at 607, 207 A.2d at 827.
85. Id. The court interpreted the Philadelphia Zoning Code definition of an accessory
use as a use "subordinate to the main use and customarily incidental thereto." Id. at 605-06,
227 A.2d at 826.
86. Id. at 607, 227 A.2d at 827. To support this principle, the court cited Brennan v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustments, 409 Pa. 376, 187 A.2d 180 (1963); Eitner v. Kreitz Corp., 404 Pa.
406, 172 A.2d 320 (1961); Pierce Appeal, 384 Pa. 100, 119 A.2d 506 (1956); Firth v.
Scherzberg, 366 Pa. 443, 77 A.2d 443 (1951); Humphreys v. Stuart Realty Co., 364 Pa. 616,
73 A.2d 407 (1950); Cheswick Borough v. Bechman, 352 Pa. 79, 42 A.2d 60 (1945); In re
Gilfillan's Permit, 291 Pa. 358, 140 A. 136 (1927) (dictum).
87. Gross, 424 Pa. at 607, 227 A.2d at 827.
88. 435 Pa. 99, 255 A.2d 506 (1969).
89. Id. at 102, 255 A.2d at 507.
90. Id. The court declined to identify whether this right was protected by the Pennsylvania or United States Constitution. In an early case, Lord Appeal, 368 Pa. 121, 81 A.2d 533
(1951), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, after tracing the sanctity of private property
rights back through the common law and the Magna Carta to the Roman law, declared:
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this constitutional right was that to hinder a lawful nonconforming
property owner from being economically competitive by preventing
expansion would be inequitable."' The court, however, reaffirmed
the limitations of this right, recognizing that the expansion cannot
be detrimental to public health, welfare or safety.9 2 In addition,
the court determined that the municipality has the right to impose
"reasonable" restrictions on nonconforming uses.9 3
The natural expansion doctrine of nonconforming uses does have
a limit, and reasonable legislative restrictions will be upheld. In
Schiller-Pfeiffer v. Upper Southampton Township,9" the owner of
a machine shop which manufactured garden tools and had a tremendous increase in business challenged the constitutionality of an
amendment to a zoning ordinance. 5 The amendment limited the
expansion of any structure housing a nonconforming use to a fifty
per cent increase as of the date of the enactment of the original
ordinance.9 6 The commonwealth court ruled that the municipality
must show that the percentage limitation is reasonable in order for
its zoning acts to be upheld as constitutional exercises of the police
Both our Federal and State Constitutions provide for and guarantee to every citizen
certain unalienable rights and liberties; and with respect to property limit the paramount right of the Sovereign State to take an owner's property for a public use
only, and even then, only if it pays the owner just compensation: Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; Article I, Section 10,
Article XVI, Section 8, Constitution of Pennsylvania.
Id. at 125, 81 A.2d at 535 (emphasis in the original). The court enumerated the constitutional rights of Pennsylvanian property owners as the:
[R]ight to use his own home in any way he desires, provided he does not (1) violate
any provision of the Federal or State Constitution; or (2) create a nuisance; or (3)
violate any covenant, restriction or easement; or (4) violate any laws or zoning or
police regulations which are constitutional.
Id.
91. Silver, 435 Pa. at 102, 255 A.2d at 507. The court stated: "If a person owns property which constitutes a valid nonconforming use, it is inequitable to prevent him from expanding the property as dictates of business or modernization require." Id. The doctrine of
natural expansion applies only to commercial and industrial property, not to residential
property. See Tanglinger v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of South Union, 103 Pa. Commw. 73, 519
A.2d 1071 (1987).
92. Silver, 435 Pa. at 102, 255 A.2d at 507. Justices Cohen and Pomeroy based their
dissent on finding that a zoning ordinance limiting nonconforming uses was not constitutional because municipalities could restrict the "aggravation" of nonconforming uses to protect the health, moral safety and general welfare. Further, they found the proposed subdivision of existing apartments was not a natural expansion. Id. at 104, 522 A.2d at 508.
93. Id. at 102, 522 A.2d at 507.
94. 1 Pa. Commw. 588, 276 A.2d 334 (1971).
95. Id. at 590, 276 A.2d at 335. Both parties agreed that the proposed addition to
house a longer assembly line was required by natural expansion in the garden tool manufacturer's business due to an 118% increase since 1962. Id. at 591-92, 276 A.2d at 336.
96. Id. at 590, 276 A.2d at 336.
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power." Here, in a 5-2 decision,"" the commonwealth court concluded that the municipality had shown the restriction to be reasonable, and upheld the amendment as constitutional.9
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Kramer considered the percentage
limitation arbitrary, confiscatory, and an unreasonable exercise of
the police power."° He recommended shifting the burden of proof
to the municipality to show that any further expansion would detrimentally impact on the public welfare.10 1 Joining Judge Kramer,
Judge Manderino argued that because property is unique, any
mathematical formula limiting expansion is arbitrary since it is not
rationally related to promoting the community's health, welfare
and safety. 102 He urged a case by case analysis of these
10 3
situations.
The zoning board in its legislative capacity may permit a change
of one nonconforming use to another, usually to one more compatible with the classification of the district. However, absent an ordinance legitimatizing the change of uses, the nonconforming use is
limited to the existing use at the time of the passage of the zoning
ordinance making the use nonconforming.1 04 In Hanna v. Board of
Appeals,1 05 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that if the zoning ordinance forbids an existing building to be altered to effectuate a new use, then a new building cannot be erected to house a
97. Id. at 593, 276 A.2d at 336.
98. Id. The majority was comprised of President Judge Bowman and Judges Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer, and Rogers. Judge Crumlish wrote a concurring opinion. The dissenters
were Judges Kramer and Manderino.
99. Id. at 595, 276 A.2d at 337.
100. Id. at 610, 276 A.2d at 344. Judge Kramer wrote a dissertation on the law regarding expansion of nonconforming uses. Id. at 596-612, 276 A.2d at 338-45.
101. Id. at 611, 276 A.2d at 345.
102. Id. at 596-97, 276 A.2d at 345-46.
103. Id. at 597-98, 276 A.2d at 346. However, the majority opinion favors the view that
zoning ordinances which limited the expansion to a certain percentage of the existing one,
usually in the twenty-five percent to fifty percent range, were reasonable, and therefore,
constitutional exercises of zoning power. See Torak v. Board of Adjustment of Upper Merrion Township, 2 Pa. Commw. 48, 277 A.2d 521 (1971); In re Groff's Appeal, 1 Pa. Commw.
439, 274 A.2d 574 (1971); and City of Philadelphia v. Angelone, 3 Pa. Commw. 119, 280 A.2d
672 (1971). In this later case, Judges Manderino and Kramer were joined by Judge Crumlish
in a dissent which essentially echoed the dissent of Schiller-Pfeiffer v. Upper Southampton
Township, 1 Pa. Commw. 588, 276 A.2d 334 (1971).
104. Hanna v. Board of Adjustments, 408 Pa. 306, 183 A.2d 539 (1962).
105. Id. In this case, an oil company purchased an option on a piece of land which had
been classified as an existing nonconforming use containing a used car business and a residence in an area zoned residential. The oil company planned to demolish both existing
structures and build a gasoline service station with the appurtenant equipment of pumps
and tanks. Id. at 310, 183 A.2d at 541.
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new use. 10 6 The court stated that the nonconforming use which enjoys constitutional protection is the one existing at the time of the
passage of the zoning ordinance, not a future nonconforming
use. 10 7 The supreme court recognized that if changes were permitted as ot right, then nonconforming uses could last indefinitely,
contrary to the goal of municipal planners to eliminate them as
speedily as possible. 10 8
The court may also limit expansion by finding that the expansion is a new and different use, and hence, severable from the original nonconforming use. In Mignattis Appeal,109 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court refused to permit the owner of a quarry and stone
crushing business to construct a concrete mixing plant as an accessory use or as a reasonable enlargement or extension of the lawfully existing nonconforming use." 0 Considering such factors as the
size of the capital investment, the physical bulk of the additional
equipment and facilities, and the resulting increase in traffic and
labor present at the site, the court concluded that the quarry
owner would be embarking on a new venture."'
Using the criteria of jeopardizing the public's health, welfare or
safety, the court has disallowed expansion where the proposed expansion would transform a manual process into a mechanical one
attended by an increase in traffic, noise, dust and air pollution."'
During the 1970's, the commonwealth court braked the natural ex3
pansion doctrine of nonconforming uses in a trio of cases."
In the first case, Casilio and Sons v. Zoning Hearing Board of
106. Id. at 311, 183 A.2d at 542.
107. Id. at 313, 183 A.2d at 543.
108. Id. at 314, 183 A.2d at 544. The court stated that the grant of permission to the
oil company in such cases would mean "an almost indefinite continuance of a nonconforming use by periodic rebuilding of structures on the land which would be at complete variance
with the spirit of a zoning ordinance, i.e., the gradual elimination of nonconforming use." Id.
at 314, 183 A.2d at 544.
109. 403 Pa. 144, 168 A.2d 567 (1961).
110. Id. at 146-147, 168 A.2d at 569. The court stated that "[t]hese factors indicate
that the bituminous concrete plant would involve the addition not only of new and different
chemical and manufacturing processes, but would also create problems of space, storage and
traffic, heretofore foreign to the existing use." Id. at 147, 168 A.2d at 569.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Thayer v. Lower Milford Township, 16 Pa. Commw. 124, 343 A.2d 92
(1974); B & B Shoe Products Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 28 Pa. Commw. 475, 368 A.2d 1332
(1977); and Hawser v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 20 Pa. Commw. 313, 341 A.2d 566 (1975).
113. Chartiers,542 A.2d at 989. Three leading cases in this area include: Township of
Kelly v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 36 Pa. Commw. 509, 388 A.2d 347 (1978); Casilio and Sons v.
Zoning Hearing Bd. of the Township of Stroud, 26 Pa. Commw. 608, 364 A.2d 969 (1976);
and Putkowski v. City of Scranton, 58 Pa. Commw. 604, 428 A.2d 743 (1981).
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the Township of Stroud,1" the court refused to permit a nonconforming use to be expanded from a manual sand and gravel
processing plant to a mechanical plant complete with conveyor
belts, a washing system, and a crushing mechanism. 1 5 Although
the use of the property remained the same, the court held that
such expansion was not reasonable, citing the attending pollution
and truck traffic as detrimental to the public's health, safety and
116
welfare.
In Township of Kelly v. Zoning Hearing Board,11 7 the court
found that the change in operation of a junkyard from the manual
disassembly of cars with a hand-held acetylene torch to the addition of 940-ton hydraulic shear on the property was an unreasonable expansion which would lead to a new use. 8 The court conditioned the modernization of a business on a reasonable adaptation
to the existing use and a harmony with the public interest.11 9 The
court broadly stated: "Thus, any expansion must be reasonable, it
must not lead to the creation of a new nonconforming use, it must
only be that which is absolutely necessary, and it must not be inconsistent with the public interest."12 The court found that new
materials would now be processed, the vast increase of cars junked
per day constituted not merely a difference in degree but one in
kind, and the owner did not carry his burden of showing that the
expansion was not detrimental to the community.1 '
Finally, in Putkowski v. City of Scranton,'22 the court found
that the introduction of mechanical equipment to a junkyard operation which had previously been manually performed was an unreasonable expansion which would create a new use. 2 3 The junkyard operator, who had disassembled five to six cars a day by
hand, expanded his operation with the addition of a mechanical
car crusher which could process seventeen cars in seventy minutes.12 " He contended that under the Pennsylvania Supreme
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

26 Pa. Commw. 608, 364 A.2d 969 (1976).
Id. at 611, 364 A.2d at 969.
Id.
36 Pa. Commw. 509, 388 A.2d 347 (1978).
Id. at 510, 388 A.2d at 348.
Id. at 512, 388 A.2d at 349.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 515-16, 388 A.2d at 349.
58 Pa. Commw. 604, 428 A.2d 743 (1981).
Id. at 606, 428 A.2d at 744.
Id. at 605-06, 428 A.2d at 744.
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Court's holding in Cheswick Borough v. Bechman,12 5 the addition
of the car crusher was a proper extension of his nonconforming use
by means of employing more modern equipment. 12 6 The commonwealth court, relying on its prior decisions in Township of Kelly v.
Zoning Hearing Board127 and Casilio and Sons v. Zoning Hearing
Board of the Township of Stroud,12 formulated the rule that "a
change in method and quantity of production can be so vast as to
constitute a new use."12 9 Applying this standard, the court found
that the introduction of the mechanical car crusher would constitute a "drastic" change in machinery, procedures and buildings in
a magnitude so great as to be a new use. 30
Township of Chartiers v. William H. Martin, Incorporated was
the first opportunity for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to consider the limitation standard proposed by the commonwealth court
in Putkowski.'3 ' Justice McDermott first established Chambers'
absolute right to increase its intake under the doctrine of natural
expansion.13 2 The court accomplished this by recounting Pennsylvania's history of the "natural expansion doctrine"' 3 3 beginning
125. 352 Pa. 79, 42 A.2d 60 (1945).
126. Putkowski, 58 Pa. Commw. at 606, 428 A.2d at 744.
127. 36 Pa. Commw. 509, 388 A.2d 347 (1978).
128. 26 Pa. Commw. 608, 364 A.2d 969 (1976).
129. Putkowski, 58 Pa. Commw. at 606, 428 A.2d at 744.
130. Id.
131. Two cases that have reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court since Putkowski
was decided in 1981 did not involve the same type of expansion of a nonconforming use as
Putkowski. In Bachman v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Bern Township, 508 Pa. 180, 494 A.2d
1102 (1985), an owner of eight bungalows located on his 40 acres of an area zoned institutional/recreational, who, after transferring 32 acres to the government in lieu of condemnation, illegally removed the bungalows to his remaining eight acres. The court ruled that his
self-serving testimony that he had intended to develop this contiguous piece of property was
not sufficient to permit this as an expansion of the nonconforming use. The nonconforming
use, the court ruled, was extinguished with the transfer of the property under threat of
eminent domain to the government. Id. at 187, 494 A.2d at 1105.
The second case, Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township, 490 Pa. 80, 451
A.2d 1002 (1982), involved the question of whether the natural expansion doctrine applies to
setback limitations. The court held that where it is the location of the activity or the structure on the land and not the use itself which is nonconforming, protection of existing nonconformance does not require a right to expansion. Id. at 92, 451 A.2d at 1007. This case was
noted in Chartierswhere the court stated, "[w]e note that the doctrine of natural expansion
does not apply to dimensional, space, lot size, design, structural or aesthetic restrictions of a
nonconforming use as proscribed by a zoning ordinance." Chartiers,542 A.2d at 989 n.3.
132. Chartiers,542 A.2d at 989. Justice McDermott stated that, "[g]iven these parameters it would seem, as a matter of zoning law, that Chambers had an absolute right to
increase the daily volume of intake, and to utilize the east valley, without the necessity of
obtaining a variance." Id. (emphasis in original).
133. Id. at 988. For the cases Justice McDermott relied upon, see supra notes 32, 33,
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with In re Gilfihlan's Permit."" The supreme court severely limited
Putkowski's authority for the proposition that a change in method,
quantity, or production of a nonconforming use could become a
completely new use, despite the fact that the original intent of the
use remained constant. 13 5 Consequently, Justice McDermott reasoned that while the underlying rationale of Putkowski may be
valid in its own right, the commonwealth court decision contradicts
previous supreme court decisions.1 36 The court noted that rapid innovations which would dramatically alter a use so as to place it
beyond the original intended scope may force a future court to re13 7
consider the natural expansion doctrine.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court seldom hears zoning cases,
mainly due to the way many zoning issues are handled.138 Usually
the Zoning Hearing Board is the trial court, the court of common
pleas is the appellate court, and the commonwealth court is the
court of last resort.1' 9 By not seeking a variance but proceeding to
increase its intake at the Arden landfill, Chambers bypassed the
Chartiers Zoning Board which would have decided any variance request. Chartiers, probably in response to local political pressure,
instituted these proceedings in common pleas court, seeking a preliminary injunction.
In affirming the stay of the preliminary injunction, Justice McDermott affirmed the correct result reached by the court below.
However, by limiting the commonwealth court line of cases which
culminated in Putkowski, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court waived
the opportunity to restrict the natural expansion doctrine. The
court returned to the policy of staunchly protecting the expectations of commercial and industrial property owners of nonconforming uses. It should be noted that Putkowski formulated a new, albeit vague, limitation on the extent to which a nonconforming use
could be expanded, breaking away from earlier Pennsylvania Su134. See supra notes 66-68.
135. Chartiers, 542 A.2d at 989.
136. Id.
137. Id. Justice McDermott stated that:
Perhaps the motivation behind Putkowski, i.e., that in today's fast changing world a
modern innovation can alter a use so dramatically as to place it beyond what was ever
intended to be allowed, will force us one day to reconsider our prior decisions. However, the fact remains that at the time of the litigation the controlling law in this
subject favored Chambers' position.
Id.
138.

See generally Wolff, Procedure under Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning

Code, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1975).
139.

See 53

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 11001-11011

(Purdon 1972).
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preme Court decisions granting the property owner liberal expansion rights. In Chartiers,the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should
have endorsed this limitation developed by the commonwealth
court, which often acts as the court of last resort in zoning matters.
Even under the Putkowski standard, Chartiers Township probably
would not have prevailed because the increase of intake would not
have constituted a "vast" change in the method of operations. A
limitation on the natural expansion would have advanced the ultimate goal of municipal planners to eliminate the nonconforming
use.
Michele Smith

